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Federal Taxation
by Michael H. Plowgian*
and Svetoslav S. Minkov**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2004 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals published three tax
decisions of note. In the first of those decisions, the Eleventh Circuit
held that taxes that are untimely assessed, yet properly owed and duly
paid, are not refundable.' In the second, a criminal tax evasion case,
the Eleventh Circuit held that enhancing a criminal sentence due to
obstruction ofjustice for making false statements to conceal a fraudulent
tax return was not "double counting" under federal sentencing guidelines.2 Finally, in a brief opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that "toters"
used to transport manufactured homes did not qualify as "tractors"
under the definition of section 4051(a)(1)(E) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code"),3 and therefore, were not subject
to a twelve percent federal excise tax.4
The United States district courts within the Eleventh Circuit also
published three noteworthy tax decisions. In one of those decisions, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida applied

* Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Denison University
(B.A., 1999); Tufts University (M.A.L.D., 2003); Harvard University (J.D., 2003).
** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Sofia University
(Bulgarian J.D. equivalent, 1999); University of Illinois (L.L.M., 2001; J.D., 2004; J.S.D.,
2004).
This Article does not represent the views of King & Spalding LLP, but solely reflects the
views of its Authors.
1. Williams-Russell & Johnson, Inc. v. United States, 371 F.3d 1350, 1352-53 (11th Cir.
2004).
2. United States v. Uscinski, 369 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004).
3. I.R.C. § 4051(a)(1)(E) (2000). Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to
the Code.
4. Horton Homes, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 2004).
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policy considerations in disregarding the literal language of section 4251. 5 The court held that the excise tax provided for in that
section applied to long-distance telephone services that were billed
according to toll charges that varied by time alone, and not by distance.'
In another case, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida held that an employee leasing company was a co-employer for
purposes of employment withholding taxes, and therefore was liable for
the payment of those taxes.' Finally, in a third decision, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia concluded that
the Internal Revenue Service must consider an offer in compromise from
a debtor in bankruptcy proceedings on the same8 grounds as it would
consider a similar offer from any other taxpayer.
II.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES

A. Untimely Assessed But Properly Owed and Duly Paid Taxes Not
Refundable
In Williams-Russell & Johnson, Inc. v. United States,9 the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed a decision of the District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia that employment taxes that were untimely assessed, but
otherwise properly owed and timely paid within the statutory period for
assessment and collection, were not overpayments and should not be
refunded."
Between 1993 and 1995, Williams-Russell & Johnson, Inc. ("WRJ")
filed its monthly employment tax returns and duly paid its employment
taxes as it estimated them. The Internal Revenue Service (the "Service")
determined that WRJ owed additional employment taxes during this
period but failed to assess the deficiency until June 1999, after the
applicable three-year period of limitations under section 6501(a) 1 had
expired. The Service conceded that it could not collect the unpaid
balance it assessed in 1999 because of the statute of limitations. The
taxpayer, however, subsequently filed a claim for refund, arguing that
the late assessment entitled it to a refund of all employment taxes it
paid between 1993 and 1995. The Service denied the claim for refund

5. Am. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc. v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1367-88 (S.D.
Fla. 2004); I.R.C. § 4251 (2000).
6. Am. Bankers, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-68.
7. United States v. Total Employment Co., 305 B.R. 333, 341 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
8. IRS v. Holmes, 309 B.R. 824 (M.D. Ga. 2004).
9. 371 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2004).
10. Id. at 1352-53.
11. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2000).
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on the basis that it was barred by the statute of limitations under
section 6511.12
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
dismissed the taxpayer's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
finding that there was no overpayment and that, in any event, the claim
13
was time-barred. The taxpayer appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
WRJ argued that the late assessment created an overpayment of taxes
under section 6401(a), 4 thereby entitling WRJ to a refund. Section
6401(a) defines the term "overpayment" to include "that part of the
amount of the payment of the internal revenue tax which is assessed or
collected after the expiration of the period of limitation properly
applicable thereto.""5 Because the Service assessed the amount the
taxpayer actually paid plus an additional amount after the limitations
WRJ argued that the late assessment created an
period had expired,
16
overpayment.

The court acknowledged that a literal reading of the statute supported
the taxpayer's argument, but noted that the real issue was "whether...
payments, properly owed and paid within the [statute of] limitations
period, somehow became 'overpayments' merely because the IRS did not
get around to assessing liability for them until after the limitations
period expired." 7 Recognizing this as an issue of first impression in
the Eleventh Circuit, the court followed other circuit court decisions,
8
which have consistently answered this question in the negative.'
In disregarding the literal reading of section 6401(a), the Eleventh
Circuit invoked the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v.
Reynolds 9 by holding that "'a taxpayer's claim for refund must be
reduced by the amount of the correct tax liability for the taxable year,
regardless of the fact that the Commissioner can no longer assess any
deficiency for the taxable year."'2 ° Following the Supreme Court's
holding, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "'an assessment is not a

12. Williams-Russell, 371 F.3d at 1351-52; I.R.C. § 6511 (2000).
13. Williams-Russell, 371 F.3d at 1351.
14. I.R.C. § 6401(a) (2000).
15. Id.
16. Williams-Russell & Johnson, Inc., 371 F.3d at 1352.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1352-53. See Moran v. United States, 63 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1995),
overruled in part by 268 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2001); Ewing v. United States, 914 F.2d 499,
501 (4th Cir. 1990); Crompton & Knowles Loom Works v. White, 65 F.2d 132, 133-34 (1st
Cir. 1933).
19. 284 U.S. 281 (1932).
20. Williams-Russell, 371 F.3d at 1353 (quoting Bachner v. Commissioner, 109 T.C.
125, 130 (1997), aff'd, 172 F.3d 859 (3rd Cir. 1998)).
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prerequisite to tax liability ... [but] only a formal determination that a
The court determined that section 650122
taxpayer owes money."''
of the Code simply prohibits the Service from forcibly collecting taxes
after the expiration of the statute of limitations. 2' The court decided
that section 640124 does not allow a taxpayer to recover taxes correctly
owed and paid.25
In light of its holding, the Eleventh Circuit did not reach the question
of whether, if the taxpayer were due a refund under section 6401, the
three-year limitations period of section 6511 would nevertheless bar that
refund. However, the court indicated that it likely would rule in favor
of the Service on that issue because the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Dalm26 decided a similar issue-whether the statute
of limitations under section 6511 runs from the payment or the
assessment of the tax-against the taxpayer.
B. Sentence Enhancement Due to Obstructionof Justice is Not
Double Counting Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines
In United States v. Uscinski,2" the Eleventh Circuit upheld a district
court's enhancement of a defendant's criminal sentence for obstruction
of justice when the defendant made false statements to law enforcement
officials to conceal the defendant's crime of tax evasion.29 The court
reasoned that the false statements were not included in the sentencing
calculation for tax evasion. 0
In 2002 Henry Uscinski ("Uscinski") pleaded guilty to tax evasion
under section 7201"' because he willfully filed a false tax return for the
1996 tax year. Between August and November 1996, Uscinski withdrew
approximately $1.5 million from a client's account for Uscinski's personal

21. Id. (quoting Moran, 63 F.3d at 666).
22. I.R.C. § 6501 (2000).
23. Williams-Russell, 371 F.3d at 1353.
24. I.R.C. § 6401 (2000).
25. Williams-Russell, 371 F.3d at 1353.
26. 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
27. Williams-Russell, 371 F.3d at 1353 n.2 (citing Dalm, 494 U.S. at 609 n.7).
28. 369 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004).
29. Id. at 1247.
30. Id.
31. I.R.C. § 7201 (2000). Section 7201 provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
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use. Uscinski did not report the funds as income on his 1996 federal
income tax return. 2
In 1997 the federal government learned of Uscinski's control over the
client's account and the transfers of funds. When the government asked
about the transfers, Uscinski lied about the purpose for the transfers,
stating that the money was used to support his client's family. After an
investigation with the help of foreign governments, the United States
government discovered that the money had actually been used for
Uscinski's personal benefit. The government charged Uscinski with tax
evasion, to which he pleaded guilty. The Pre-Sentencing Investigation
report recommended, and the district court imposed, a two-level increase
for obstruction of justice.33 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
section 3C1.1 3 4 provides a two-level enhancement if "the defendant
willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice during the course of the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction." 5
Application note 4(g)" provides that the enhancement for obstruction
of justice may apply if a defendant made a "materially false statement
to a law enforcement officer ...

that ...

significantly obstructed or

impeded the [official] investigation."3 7 Uscinski argued, among other
things, that the district court erred in imposing an enhancement for
obstruction ofjustice because "imposition of the enhancement constituted
impermissible double counting."3"
Uscinski argued that his false statements were an attempt to evade
tax, which was exactly the kind of harm already factored into the
sentencing guidelines for tax evasion; thus, enhancing the sentence for
making the false statements would be "double counting." 39 Impermissible double counting of enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines
occurs "'when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase a
defendant's punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already
been fully accounted for by application of another part of the Guidelines. "'' 40 According to the Eleventh Circuit, the guideline calculation
for tax evasion-U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual section 2T1.141-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Uscinski, 369 F.3d at 1245-46.
Id. at 1246.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2004).
Id.
Id. cmt. n.4(g).
Id.
Uscinski, 369 F.3d at 1246.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Naves, 252 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir. 2001)).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1 (2004).
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did not take into account Uscinski's statements because those statements
were not part of Uscinski's offense of tax evasion under section 7201.42
According to the Eleventh Circuit, false statements are sometimes part
of the offense of tax evasion under section 7201,4' but "when tax
evasion involves the filing of a fraudulent tax return, the offense is
complete upon filing."" The court reasoned that, because Uscinski's
tax evasion was complete upon the filing of his tax return, his false
statements to the government were not a continuation of his crime.45
On the contrary, false statements constituted a separate harm for which
an enhancement was appropriate.4 6
C. Definition of "Tractor" Under Section 4051(a)(1)(E)
In Horton Homes, Inc. v. United States, 47 the Eleventh Circuit
reversed a lower-court decision holding that "toters" used to transport
manufactured homes were subject to a twelve percent federal excise tax
The Eleventh Circuit
as "tractors" under section 4051(a)(1)(E). 4'
reasoned that, while the toters qualified as tractors under the regulatory
definition49of that term, they did not meet the statutory definition of
"tractor."
Horton Homes, Inc. ("Horton") purchased certain vehicles, known as
toters, to transport manufactured homes from the plant where the homes
were built to retail dealers of the homes.5 ° Section 4051(a)(1)51
imposes an excise tax on the "first retail sale" of various vehicles and
vehicle components, including "[tractors of the kind chiefly used for
highway transportation in combination with a trailer or semitrailer."52
From 1963 to 1982, "tractor" was defined in regulations that generally
recited the statutory definition. In 1983 the Treasury Department
promulgated a new regulatory definition of "tractor" for purposes of
section 4051(a)(1)(E):
The term "tractor" means a highway vehicle primarily designed to tow
a vehicle, such as a trailer or semitrailer, but does not carry cargo on

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Uscinski, 369 F.3d at 1247.
Id. (citing United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 973 (11th Cir. 1992)).
Id. (citing Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965)).
Id.
Id. at 1248 (citing United States v. Sabino, 307 F.3d 446, 451 (6th Cir. 2002)).
357 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1212-13; I.R.C. § 4051(a)(1)(E) (2000).
Horton Homes, 357 F.3d at 1212.
Id. at 1210.
I.R.C. § 4051(a)(1) (2000).
I.R.C. § 4051(a)(1)(E).
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the same chassis as the engine. A vehicle equipped with air brakes
and/or towing package will be presumed to be primarily designed as a
tractor.53
The Service determined that Horton's toters fell within the regulatory
definition of a tractor for purposes of section 4051 and assessed the
twelve percent excise tax on the'toters from 1989 until 1995. Horton
filed a claim for a refund of the excise taxes paid and sought a5 4judgment
that the toters would not be subject to the tax in the future.
The district court ruled that the toters purchased by Horton were
tractors within the regulatory meaning of the term, and thus were
subject to the federal excise tax.55 The district court did not address
whether the regulations comported with the statutory requirements,
noting that "Congress has delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury, not
to [the courts] the task of administering the tax laws of the Nation."56
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit applied the two-part test the United
States Supreme Court articulated in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc." to the Treasury Department's
Under this test, as the
regulatory interpretation of the statute.8
a court must
Eleventh Circuit explained in Southern Co. v. FC.C.,
first:
ascertain whether Congress has spoken unambiguously "to the precise
question at issue." If the language of the statute is unambiguous, we
go no further, for we must give effect to clear congressional intent. If,
however, we determine that Congress's intent is ambiguous as to the
question at issue, we must move on to the second step of the Chevron
test and ask whether
the agency's interpretation of congressional
60
intent is reasonable.
The Eleventh Circuit examined the statutory language of section 4051(a)(1)(E) to determine if the language clearly states the kinds
of tractors that Congress intended to make subject to the twelve percent
excise tax. 6 1 The Eleventh Circuit observed that the statutory language
limits the kinds of tractors subject to the excise tax to "'[tiractors of the

53.
54.
2002).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Treas. Reg. § 145.4051-1(e)(1)(i) (as amended 2000).
Horton Homes, Inc. v. United States, 90 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7548, 7549 (M.D. Ga.
Id. at 7550.
Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156 (1981)).
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Horton Homes, 357 F.3d at 1211.
293 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1343.
Horton Homes, 357 F.3d at 1212.
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kind chiefly used for highway transportation in combination with a
trailer or semitrailer."'' 2 The Service admitted in its brief and at oral
argument that Horton's toters could not tow trailers or semitrailers; they
The
were used exclusively to transport manufactured homes.6"
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Horton's toters could not be "of the kind
chiefly used ... in combination with a trailer or semitrailer," and
therefore did not fall within the statutory category of tractors subject to
the tax.6 The toters, thus, were not subject to the tax, notwithstanding that they fell within the regulatory definition of a tractor.65 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that to hold otherwise would stretch the
statutory language beyond the clearly expressed congressional intent.66
III.

DISTRICT COURT CASES

A. Application of CommunicationsExcise Tax to Long-Distance
Telephone Service
In American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. v. United States, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held
that the federal excise tax on communications services under section 4251r' applied to long-distance telephone service that was billed
according to toll charges that varied by time alone and not by distance. 69 The court's decision has not been followed by other district
courts that have considered this issue, and its appeal is currently
pending before the Eleventh Circuit.
American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. ("ABIG") is a Florida
corporation headquartered in Miami. ABIG purchased international,
interstate, and intrastate long-distance telephone service from AT&T
from October 1998 through March 2002. ABIG paid a uniform toll rate
for all interstate calls made within the United States, uniform toll rates
for all intrastate long-distance calls, and toll rates for international calls
that varied only according to the country to which the calls were placed.
AT&T collected the federal excise tax under section 4251 on all of these
telephone services and remitted the tax to the Service. On February 22,

62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2004), appealdocketed, No. 04-10720-EE (11th Cir.
Feb. 17, 2004).
68. I.R.C. § 4251 (2000).
69. Am. Bankers, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1365.
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2002, ABIG filed claims with the Service for a refund of $288,496.10 for
the federal excise taxes paid from October 1998 through September
2001, and subsequently filed an additional claim for refund of the federal
excise taxes paid from October 2001 through March 2002. The Service
did not respond to either claim and ABIG filed suit on July 8, 2003.70
Section 4251(a) imposes a three percent federal excise tax on
communications services.7 ' Section 4251(b)(1) defines communications
services to include "local telephone service," "toll telephone service," and
"teletypewriter exchange service."72 The court focused on whether the
long-distance services AT&T provided to ABIG qualified as "toll
telephone service." 73 Section 4252(b) defines toll telephone service as:
(1) a telephonic quality communication for which (A) there is a toll
charge which varies in amount with the distance and elapsed transmission time of each individual communication and (B) the charge is paid
within the United States, and
(2) a service which entitles the subscriber, upon payment of a periodic
charge (determined as a flat amount or upon the basis of total elapsed
transmission time), to the privilege of an unlimited number of
telephonic communications to or from all or a substantial portion of the
persons having telephone or radio telephone stations in a specified area
area in which the station
which is outside the local telephone system
74
provided with this service is located.
The parties focused on the first category of services (described in
section 4252(b)(1)) as more likely to apply to the services purchased by
ABIG. ABIG contended that the statutory definition requires that, to be
taxable as a toll telephone service under section 4252(b)(1), the toll
charge for the service must vary as a function of both time and distance.
The Service argued that the statutory language was ambiguous and that
the congressional intent behind the provision was to tax all long-distance
telephone service.75
The court noted that under applicable Eleventh Circuit law, a court
may look to evidence of congressional intent outside the statutory
language when interpreting a federal statute only if "'(1) the statute's
language is ambiguous; (2) applying [the statute] according to its plain
meaning would lead to an absurd result; or (3) there is clear evidence of

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 1362-63.
I.R.C. § 4251(a).
I.R.C. § 4251(b)(1).
Am. Bankers, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
I.R.C. § 4252(b) (2000).
Am. Bankers, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
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contrary legislative intent."'' 6 The court thus examined whether the
statutory language was ambiguous and concluded that the word "and"
in the phrase "varies in amount with the distance and elapsed transmisThe court acknowledged that the word
sion time" was ambiguous.
"and" is generally used conjunctively in a statute, but cited a string of
cases in which the word "and" may have been used disjunctively-that
is, to mean any or all of a series of categories. 8 Indeed, the court
observed that later in the same section, the word "and" was used to link
section 4252(b)(1) and (b)(2) and that a service could not literally qualify
under both such subsections at the same time. 9 This suggested to the
court that the word "and" was intended to be disjunctive in that case.8"
The court reasoned that "and" might also have been intended disjunctively in the phrase "varies in amount with the distance and elapsed
transmission time," and therefore, the court looked to the provision's
legislative history to determine congressional intent.8 "
The court noted that the definition of toll telephone service was
amended in 1965 to conform to the types of long-distance service offered
by AT&T. 2 In 1965 AT&T offered two types of service. In the first
type of service, described in section 4252(b)(1), the toll charges imposed
by AT&T for long-distance telephone service did, in fact, vary according
to both time and distance. The second type of service (referred to as
"WATS"), described in section 4252(b)(2), provided the subscriber the
right to make either unlimited long-distance calls or calls up to a certain
hourly limit upon payment of a monthly fee.8 3 Because AT&T had a
virtual monopoly on long-distance telephone service in 1965, the court
concluded that by including all types of long-distance service offered by
AT&T at the time, Congress must have intended to make clear that all
long-distance telephone service was to be taxed as "toll telephone
service."8 4 The court did not address the argument that because
AT&T's toll charges for long-distance service in 1965 varied according to
both distance and time, Congress meant precisely what it said and
intended to tax long-distance telephone service for which toll charges
varied by both distance and time.

76. Id. at 1364 (quoting Moore v. Am. Fed. of Television & Radio Artists, 216 F.3d
1236, 1244 (l1th Cir. 2000)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1364-65 (citing, e.g., United States v. Fisk, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 445, 447 (1865)).
79. Id. at 1365.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1367, 1369.
83. Id. at 1367.
84. Id. at 1365-66.
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Furthermore, the court noted that the legislative history of subsequent
re-enactments of the tax appeared to equate long-distance telephone
service with toll telephone service, suggesting that Congress intended to
include all forms of long-distance telephone service within the definition
of toll telephone service. 85 , Additionally, the court noted that in 1979
the Service issued Revenue Ruling 79-404,6 which interpreted the
statutory language to apply to long-distance service for which the toll
charges varied only according to time.87 While a revenue ruling is
subject to deference only to the extent of its ability to persuade,8 8 the
court reasoned that Revenue Ruling 79-404 was subject to deference
because it persuasively analyzed the congressional intent behind the
provision. 89
Finally, the court suggested that to interpret the statute in the
manner suggested by ABIG would effectively read section 4252(b)(1) out
of the Code because most toll charges for long-distance service now vary
solely by time (and not by distance), and thus, would not be subject to
the tax under ABIG's interpretation. 90
The opinions of other courts appear to weigh against the district
court's conclusion in American Bankers. Six federal trial-level courts in
other circuits have subsequently considered this issue, and they have all
concluded that the statutory language does not apply to long-distance
service for which the toll charge varies only by time.9 1 In other words,
the courts have concluded that the statutory language requires that the
toll charge vary by both distance and time.9 2 The other trial-level
courts have found the statutory language unambiguous and have stated
that if Congress intends to tax long-distance service for which the toll
charge varies only by time, it must amend the statute.9

85. Id. at 1373.
86. Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382 (1979).
87. Am. Bankers, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1370-71.
88. Id. at 1371 (citing Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995)).
89. Id. at 1371-72.
90. Id. at 1369.
91. See Reese Bros. v. United States, 94 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 7229, 7242 (W.D. Pa. 2004);
Fortis, Inc. v. United States, 94 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 6005 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Office Max, Inc. v.
United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 984, 993 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Amtrak v. United States, 338
F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 (D.D.C. 2004); Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 2005 WL 375601
(Fed. Cl. Feb. 16, 2005); America Online, Inc. v. United States, 2005 WL 741847 (Fed. Cl.
Mar. 30, 2005).
92. See Reese Bros., 94 A.F.T.R. at 7242; Fortis,94 A.F.T.R. at 6005; Office Max, 309
F. Supp. 2d at 993; Amtrak, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
93. See Reese Bros., 94 A.F.T.R. at 7242; Fortis, 94 A.F.T.R. at 6005; Office Max, 309
F. Supp. 2d at 994; Amtrak, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 27-28.
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The court in American Bankers applied policy considerations in
disregarding the literal language of the statute so the tax could be
collected in that case,94 but it appears to have missed a larger policy
issue raised by the case. The technologies and business models for
providing telecommunication services have changed dramatically over
the past several decades, most notably with the introduction of voice
over internet protocol services, and it is not entirely clear whether
Congress intends to tax any or all of the new services. The statutory
definition of communication services was crafted to fit a very different
telecommunications landscape-a market dominated by a single, large
company. The communications industry today is comprised of multiple
competitors, both large and small. By failing to create a set of broader
rules that addresses the multiplicity of technologies and business models
in the current telecommunications landscape, Congress inadvertently
may skew the competitive landscape by creating arbitrary tax advantages for certain technologies or business models over others. A policybased judicial broadening of the existing rules may only delay the
response needed from Congress, and therefore, may ultimately turn out
to be harmful from a policy perspective.
B. Employee Leasing Company Held to be Co-Employer for Purposes
of Withholding Taxes.
9
the United States
In United States v. Total Employment Co.,
District Court for the Middle District of Florida overturned a decision of
the bankruptcy court and held that an employee leasing company was
an "employer" of the leased employees for purposes of employment
withholding taxes.96
Total Employment Company ("TEC") is an employee leasing company
that leased employees to various client companies. In September 2002
TEC filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code,97 and the Service subsequently filed a proof of claim and amended proof of claims for unpaid federal employment taxes for employees
leased by TEC to four client companies. The bulk of the claim related
to employees leased to subsidiaries of American Enterprise Solutions,
Inc. ("AESI"), and the court treated the employees leased to AESI as
exemplary of the employees in the other cases. 98

94. Am. Bankers, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1366-67.
95. 305 B.R. 333 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
96. Id. at 341.
97. As used herein, the term "Bankruptcy Code" refers to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000).
98. Total Employment Co., 305 B.R. at 336-37.
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The Florida statute that governs the conduct of employee leasing
companies provides that the leasing contract must contain a provision
that the leasing company: "(b) assumes responsibility for the payment
of wages to the leased employees without regard to payments by the
client to the leasing company" and "(c) assumes full responsibility for the
payment of payroll taxes and collection of taxes from payroll on leased
employees."9 9
Thus, the contract between TEC and AESI provided that "TEC
assumes responsibility for the payment of wages to the leased employees
without regard to payments by [AESI] to TEC and TEC assumes full
responsibility for the payment of payroll taxes and collection of taxes
from payroll on leased employees."' 00 The contract also provided that
if the contract were terminated, AESI would assume "all federal, state
and local obligations of any employer to the employees which are not in
conflict with state or federal law, and shall immediately assume full
responsibility for providing workers' compensation coverage," and that
TEC would be immediately released from these obligations as permitted
by law.10'
During 1999 AESI fell behind in its payments to TEC, and TEC paid
AESI's employees' wages on AESI's behalf. In January 2000 TEC paid
the AESI employees' wages for approximately two weeks out of its own
funds without requiring advance payment by AESI. TEC did not pay
federal employment taxes on the wages it paid during those two weeks.
Thereafter, TEC insisted upon receiving payment for net payroll and
certain benefits from AESI prior to issuing payroll checks. TEC0 2neither
required AESI to remit taxes nor paid the payroll taxes itself.1
TEC attempted to shift the burden of paying the employment taxes to
AESI by drafting an addendum to the contract that stated:
As a result of the agreement previously entered into between TEC and
AESI for professional employer services, and in consideration for the
continued extension of credit to AESI by TEC in regards to payment
for services rendered, AESI agrees to reimburse TEC for all payroll tax
penalties arising from 0 3TEC not being able to meet [AESI's] tax
payment requirements.
TEC continued to pay wages to the employees it leased to AESI until
the contract was terminated in November 2000. Although TEC reported

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Fla. Stat. § 468.525(4)(b)-(c) (2004).
Total Employment Co., 305 B.R. at 335-36.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 337.
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withheld income taxes and social security (FICA) taxes, it made several
late payments and failed to deposit over $1.9 million in payroll taxes.
Because of the underpayments, the Service claimed penalties and
interest in addition to the deficiency.'
TEC argued that it was not required to withhold employment taxes
because it was not an employer for purposes of withholding taxes. The
Service and TEC stipulated that AESI was the common law employer of
the employees, and as such, had a non-delegable duty to withhold
employment taxes on wages paid to the employees. Because TEC was
not the common law employer of the employees, it could only be an
employer for purposes of section 3401(d)10 if TEC was in control of the
payment of wages.10 6 Section 3401(d) defines "employer" in relevant
part as:
the person for whom an individual performs or performed any service,
of whatever nature, as the employee of such person, except that(1) if the person for whom the individual performs or performed the
services does not have control of the payment of the wages for such
... means the person having control of
services, the term "employer"
107
the payment of such wages.
In Earthmovers,Inc. v. United States (In re Earthmovers, Inc.),' the
bankruptcy court considered the same issue and concluded that the
leasing company was a "co-employer" of the workers, and that the
Service could look to both the leasing company and the client company
for payment of the taxes but could only collect once.10 9
TEC argued that because AESI was obligated to advance the funds for
the payment of the wages, AESI, and not TEC, was in control of the
In Otte v. United States,"' however, the
payment of the wages. 1
Supreme Court determined that section 3401(d)(1) was intended to place
responsibility for withholding at the point of control-the point of actual
payment of wages." 2 Following this reasoning, the district court

104. Id.
105. I.R.C. § 3401(d) (2000).
106. Total Employment Co., 305 B.R. at 338.
107. I.R.C. § 3401(d).
108. 199 B.R. 62 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
109. Total Employment Co., 305 B.R. at 330. TEC argued that the conclusion that the
leasing company in Earthmovers was an employer for purposes of § 3401(d) was dicta
because the taxpayer in that case conceded its liability for the taxes. The district court
found the reasoning in Earthmovers persuasive, however, and followed that reasoning. Id.
110. Id.
111. 419 U.S. 43 (1974).
112. Id. at 50-51.
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concluded that the person that actually makes the payment to the
employee is the employer and is, therefore, responsible for withholding
employment taxes. 113 Because TEC had control of the payment of
wages under Florida law and its contract with AESI, it was an employer
3401(d)(1) and had an obligation to withhold employment
under 11section
4
taxes.
TEC also argued that the structure of Florida Statutes section
468.525(4)"5 suggested that the employee leasing company did not
have an obligation to pay the payroll taxes unless the client company
first paid the amount of those taxes to the employee leasing company.11 6 In support of this argument, TEC noted that Florida Statutes
section 468.525(4)(b) states that wages are to be paid by the employee
leasing company "without regard to the payments by the client to the
leasing company."117 The phrase "without regard to payments by the
client to the leasing company," however, does not modify the leasing
company's responsibility to pay payroll taxes and collect taxes from the
payroll of the leased employees. "8
First, the
The court rejected this argument for two reasons."'
statute placed full responsibility on the leasing company to pay the
payroll taxes without qualification. 2 ° Second, because TEC controlled
the payment of wages, it would be liable for withholding the federal
regardless of whether the Florida statute imposed that
payroll taxes
121
obligation.
Finally, TEC argued that it had an agreement with AESI'that,
because AESI was not paying the payroll taxes in advance, TEC would
not make payment of payroll taxes to the Service. 122 The court
rejected this argument as a violation of Florida law, which requires all
leasing companies to pay the payroll taxes.1 23 Any contract purporting
to shift responsibility for paying payroll taxes away from the leasing
24
company would violate the statute, and therefore, would be void.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Total Employment Co., 305 B.R. at 339.

Id.
Fla. Stat. § 468.525(d) (2004).
Total Employment Co., 305 B.R. at 339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 341.

1302

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

The court concluded that TEC, along with AESI, was responsible for
the payroll taxes but that, as between TEC and AESI, AESI had the
ultimate responsibility and would be liable to TEC if and when TEC
paid the taxes to the Service.' 5
C. Service Must Consider a Debtor's Offer of Compromise
In IRS v. Holmes, 2 ' the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia concluded that the Service must consider an offer in
compromise from a debtor in bankruptcy proceedings according to the
same procedures it uses to consider offers of compromise from any other
taxpayer.127
William K. Holmes ("Holmes") was a debtor in Chapter 11 proceedings
before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of
Georgia. In 2000 Holmes had approximately 3.2 million shares of
WorldCom stock in a margin account. As WorldCom's share price fell,
Holmes's broker sold shares to cover the margin calls, generating
significant taxable gains for Holmes but failing to generate any cash to
pay the taxes due on such gains. On July 1, 2002, Holmes filed a
bankruptcy 12petition seeking relief under Chapter 11 for a plan of
liquidation.

The Service filed an amended proof of claim in the bankruptcy
proceeding, which included a priority claim for income tax and interest
totaling $9,372,245.01, and a general unsecured claim for $920,462.40
for penalties pertaining to the tax due. Holmes submitted an offer in
compromise to the Service to pay $621,326 in satisfaction of the Service's
claim against him. The Service informed Holmes that it would not
process the offer because it has a policy against considering any offers
29
of compromise made by persons involved in bankruptcy proceedings.'
Holmes asked the bankruptcy court to enter an order requiring the
Service to consider the offer in compromise. The bankruptcy court
granted the motion, holding that § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code 3 °
authorized the bankruptcy court to direct the Service to process and
consider Holmes's offer.'"' Under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, a
bankruptcy court "may issue any order, process or judgment that is

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
309 B.R. 824 (M.D. Ga. 2004).
Id. at 828.
Id. at 826.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).
Holmes, 309 B.R. at 827.
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necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of' the Bankruptcy

Code. 132
The Service appealed the order to the district court and argued that
the bankruptcy court could not order the Service to discharge Holmes's
tax liability.'3 3 The district court rejected this argument, reasoning
that the order did not force the Service to discharge the tax liability, but
merely to apply the same guidelines to a debtor in bankruptcy as it
would to other4 taxpayers under the offer in compromise provision of
section 7122.1
The Service also argued that the order exceeded the bounds of § 105
of the Bankruptcy Code. 35 The district court, however, noted that
§ 105 of the Bankruptcy Code has been broadly construed and found that
the order was justified as a means of carrying out the negotiation
3
process implicitly provided for in § 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code. 1
Finally, the district court noted that the order did not force the Service
to accept the offer in compromise, but merely to consider it and, thereby
the Service could not be ordered
distinguished other cases holding 3that
7
to accept an offer in compromise.

132. 11 U.S.C. § 105.
133. Holmes, 309 B.R. at 827.
134. Id. at 828. Section 7122(a) provides:
The Secretary may compromise any civil or criminal case arising under the
internal revenue laws prior to reference to the Department of Justice for
prosecution or defense; and the Attorney General or his delegate may compromise
any such case after reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or
defense.
I.R.C. § 7122(a) (2000).
135. Holmes, 309 B.R. at 828.
136. Id. at 828-29. Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the plan of settlement
and generally contemplates a negotiation process between informed parties. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129 (2000).
137. Holmes, 309 B.R. at 829 (citing Am. Bicycle Ass'n v. United States (In re Am.
Bicycle Ass'n), 895 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1990); Addington v. United States, 75 F. Supp.
2d 520, 524 (S.D. W. Va. 1999); In re Davison, 156 B.R. 600, 602 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993)).

